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Abstract 
This paper aims to generate new theoretical and empirical insights into 
the way states and policies shape migration processes in their interaction 
with other migration determinants in receiving and sending countries. 
More fundamentally, this state of-the-art reveals a still limited 
understanding of the forces driving migration. Although there is 
consensus that macro-contextual economic and political factors and 
meso-level factors such as networks all play ‘some’ role, there is no 
agreement on their relative weight and mutual interaction. To start filling 
that gap, this paper outlines the contours of a conceptual framework for 
generating improved insights into the ways states and policies shape 
migration processes in their interaction with structural migration 
determinants in receiving and sending countries. First, it argues that the 
fragmented insights from different disciplinary theories can be integrated 
in one framework through conceptualizing virtually all forms of migration 
as a function of capabilities and aspirations. Second, to increase 
conceptual clarity it distinguishes the preponderant role of states in 
migration processes from the hypothetically more marginal role of 
specific immigration and emigration policies. Subsequently, it 
hypothesizes four different ‘substitution effects’ which can partly explain 
why polices fail to meet their objectives. This framework will serve as a 
conceptual guide for the determinants of international migration research. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines the scientific rationale of this project by analysing the main gaps in 
migration policy and migration determinants research. It outlines the contours of a 
conceptual framework and a set of hypotheses for generating improved insights into the 
ways states and policies shape migration processes in their interaction with structural 
migration determinants in receiving and sending countries, which will guide the 
determinants of international migration project. In wealthy countries, immigration, in 
particular of low-skilled and culturally distinct people from poorer countries, is 
increasingly perceived as a problem in need of control. The common – but not 
unproblematic – perception is that policy-makers have reacted to this pressure by 
implementing restrictive immigration policies and increasing border controls (Massey et 
al. 1998).  
However, the effectiveness of such policies has been often contested in the face of their 
oft-supposed failure to significantly affect the level of immigration and their 
hypothesized unintended, perverse and often counterproductive effects such as pushing 
migrants into permanent settlement, discouraging return and encouraging irregular 
movements and migration through alternative legal or geographical channels (Castles 
2004b; Grütters 2003). However, other scholars have argued that, on the whole, state 
policies have been largely effective (Brochmann & Hammar 1999; Strikwerda 1999), 
which also seems to be partly confirmed by a limited number of quantitative studies 
indicating that specific policy interventions can have a significant effect on migration 
flows.  
Despite apparently increasing immigration restrictions, the volume of South–North 
migration has only increased over the past few decades. But does this mean that migration 
policies have failed and that states are generally unable to control migration? Not 
necessarily. First of all, we should not confuse statistical association with causality, which 
is particularly difficult to establish because we generally lack counterfactual cases. For 
instance, one might argue that the migration-reducing effects of immigration restrictions 
are counterbalanced by the migration-increasing effects of growing economic gaps 
between sending and receiving countries or economic growth in receiving countries, or 
the lifting of exit restrictions by origin countries.  
Hence, sustained or increasing migration does not necessarily prove policy 
ineffectiveness – as migration volumes might have been higher without migration 
controls. The other way around, a decrease in migration does not prove the policy 
successful – although politicians are generally eager to make such claims – as such a 
decrease might for instance also be the result of economic growth or an end of conflict in 
origin countries, or an economic recession in destination countries. So, finding better 
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methodological approaches to establish (multiple) causality constitutes the first challenge 
facing research on this issue. 
Besides the huge difficulties involved in ‘proving’ causality as such, a second challenge 
is to bring more precision in research by assessing the relative importance of immigration 
policies compared to the effects of other migration determinants. After all, it can hardly 
be surprising that most policies discouraging or encouraging particular manifestations of 
migration will have ‘some’ effect. The real question is about the relative magnitude of 
this effect compared to macro-contextual migration determinants, which will eventually 
also determine the effectiveness and efficiency of policies. Although some studies assert 
a statistical relation between certain policy measures and particular migration flows, the 
relative importance of policy effects compared to the effects of other migration 
determinants remains largely unclear.  
It is one thing to find that restrictions on, say, lows killed labour migration have a 
significant effect on decreasing inflows, but the real question is how large this effect is 
compared to the effect of other factors such as economic growth, employment, violent 
political conflict and personal freedoms. If the latter factors explain most variance in 
migration, one might for instance conclude that policies have a certain, but also limited 
effect on overall volumes and trends of migration. In other words, if most variance in 
migration is explained by structural migration determinants or other policies, the margin 
of manoeuvre for migration policies is fundamentally limited. 
In addition to finding better ways to measure the existence and relative magnitude of 
policy effects, a third, related, challenge is to improve insights into the very nature and 
evolution of migration policies. There seems to be reason to question the general assertion 
that migration policies have become more restrictive over the past decades. Although this 
idea is often taken for granted, the diverse and multiple nature of migration policies raises 
questions about our ability and utility to measure ‘overall’ levels of restrictiveness, and 
even about the overall assumption that policies have become more restrictive.  
While several countries have raised barriers for particular categories of migrants (for 
instance, low-skilled workers and asylum seekers), not all countries have done so, and 
immigration of other categories has often been facilitated. Changes in migration policy 
typically facilitate the entry of particular origin groups while simultaneously restricting 
the entry of other groups. For instance, ‘Fortress Europe’ may be an adequate metaphor 
to characterize policies towards asylum seekers and refugees (Hatton 2004), but seems 
inappropriate to characterize the immigration policies of EU or OECD countries as a 
whole. 
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Another example is the US Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which ‘equalized’ 
immigration policies by ending positive discrimination of European immigrants and 
contributing to increasing non-European migration. This also reveals the strong 
Eurocentric bias underlying common views that migration to the USA, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand was largely ‘free’ until at least the mid twentieth century (Hatton & 
Williamson 1998) – it may have been relatively free for Europeans, but this was certainly 
not the case for Asians or Africans, for whom recent reforms have meant a liberalization. 
Also countries’ membership and accession to regional blocks such as the European Union 
typically coincides with liberalization of migration of citizens of member states, while 
immigration restrictions for ‘third-country’ nationals are sustained or further tightened 
(Mannan & Krueger 1996).  
Because migration policies typically consist of a ‘mixed bag’ of various measures 
targeting particular groups of immigrants, there is a considerable risk of over-
generalizing. While migration policies are likely to affect patterns of migration 
selectivity, the impact on the overall magnitude of migration flows is more uncertain as 
these are strongly affected by other macro-structural factors, while migrants’ agency and 
strategies tend to create meso-level structures which facilitate migration over formally 
closed borders. Since state policies simultaneously constrain or enable immigration and 
emigration of particular groups along particular geographical pathways, states perhaps 
play a more significant role in structuring emigration through influencing the (initial) 
composition and spatial patterns of migration, rather than in affecting overall volumes 
and long-term trends, which, particularly in liberal democracies, appear to be primarily 
affected by other, economic, social and cultural migration determinants (Mannan & 
Krueger 1998). 
These examples show that any serious inquiry into the effect of migration policies not 
only needs to define the concept, but also to ‘unpack’ or disaggregate ‘migration policies’ 
into the multitude of laws, measures and regulations states deploy in their attempts to 
regulate immigration and emigration along categories that are based on national origin 
and further characteristics such as gender, age, education, occupation and officially 
defined main migration motives. As migration policies are typically affected and shaped 
by different, often opposed, interests, policies are typically internally incoherent, which 
further emphasizes the need to break down policies into the specific measures and 
regulations they comprise. 
In addition, conventional views of increasing migration policy restrictiveness typically 
ignore emigration policies pursued by origin states, which are as diverse and multiple as 
immigration policies, but which seem to have become less restrictive overall. Only a 
declining number of strong, authoritarian states with closed economies are willing and 
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capable of imposing blanket exit restrictions. Paradoxically, while an increasing number 
of, particularly developing, countries seem to aspire to regulate emigration, their 
capability to do so is fundamentally and increasingly limited by legal (human rights), 
economic and political constraints. The ability of governments to affect overall 
immigration and emigration levels seems to decrease as the level of authoritarianism goes 
down. This also reveals the need to look beyond the role of migration policies per se and 
to explore the ways in which states affect the migration process more generally. 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
So, the crucial question remains: how do states and policies shape migration processes 
independently of and in their interaction with other migration determinants in receiving 
and sending countries? Due to serious methodological and theoretical flaws, scholarly 
research has so far hardly been able to produce convincing answers to these questions, 
and the second and third questions in particular. The inconclusive nature of this debate 
reveals an overall lack of conceptual, analytical and empirical rigour in the study of 
migration policy effects. Most existing evidence is descriptive, biased and partial, which 
is related to the weak embedding of migration policies research into general theories on 
the causes of migration. 
In this context, it is important to emphasize that the limited of capacity of research to 
answer these key questions is not exclusively linked to limitations of data and statistical 
models, but also to the rather weak theoretical foundations of ‘push-pull’ or gravity 
models which are routinely, but uncritically, used for studying migration determinants. 
For the very reason that they are often not grounded in migration theory, they tend to 
ignore or fail to properly specify several theoretically important migration determinants 
in receiving and, particularly, sending countries. Even with ideal data, statistical analyses 
will not lead to compelling evidence if theoretically relevant migration determinants are 
omitted in empirical models, or if models are based on the short term or only focus on 
one particular migration flow. This makes it impossible to study possible knock-on 
effects or what I have dubbed ‘substitution effects’ of one particular measure through the 
diversion of migration flows to other geographical, legal or illegal channels. 
In order to improve insights into the role of states and policies in migration processes, 
there is a need to embed the systematic analysis of policy effects into a comprehensive 
analytical framework of the sending- and receiving-country factors driving international 
migration. Although there is consensus that macro-contextual economic and political 
factors and meso-level factors such as networks all play ‘some’ role, there is no 
agreement on their relative weight and mutual interaction. How do migration policies 
precisely affect migration if we control for the many other factors that drive international 
migration? Or, to turn the question around: how do macro-level processes such as 
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‘development’, economic growth, demographic change, education, democratization and 
conflict in origin and destination countries affect migration independently from policy 
interventions? In other words, what are the constraints and relative margins within which 
migration policies can have an effect? 
Why has research on this issue hardly advanced over the past decades? A first problem 
is the rather weak connection between studies on migration policies and migration 
determinants on the one hand and fundamental research and theories on the causes of 
migration on the other. A second problem is that fundamental theoretical research on the 
nature and causes of migration processes has made relatively little progress over the last 
few decades (Arango 2000; Massey et al. 1998). There is a plethora of research on the 
social, cultural and economic impacts of migration on sending and, particularly, receiving 
societies.  
In comparison, and with the possible exception of research on migration networks, there 
has been much less theoretically driven research on the nature and causes of migration 
processes themselves. This particularly applies to the study of the precise role of policies 
and states in migration processes. Other factors obstructing advances in research on 
migration determinants are data problems and unproductive divisions between, 
particularly economic and non-economic, social science disciplines as well as qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. 
To start filling these research gaps, in this paper I aim to outline the contours of a 
theoretical and empirical research agenda for generating improved insights into the ways 
states and policies shape migration processes independently from and in their interaction 
with other migration determinants in receiving and sending countries. First, I will review 
existing, often disciplinary, theories on migration and I will argue how their fragmented 
insights can be integrated in one framework through conceptualizing virtually all 
manifestations of migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations to migrate. 
Second, I will argue that considerable conceptual confusion can be removed if we 
distinguish the preponderant role of states in migration processes from the hypothetically 
more marginal role of specific immigration and emigration policies. Subsequently, based 
on a brief theorization of the role of states and policies in migration I will hypothesize 
four different ‘substitution effects’ explaining migration policy failure, which can guide 
further research on migration determinants within and outside the context of the 
determinants of international migration project. 
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2.1 THEORIES OF MIGRATION 
The preceding analysis has indicated that a robust analysis of the role of states and 
policies in migration processes is conditional on its sound embedding within a more 
general theoretical framework on the determinants of migration processes. Although 
there is a quantitative, generally econometrically oriented literature on migration 
determinants including some studies on the effect of policies, the literature is generally 
characterized by a conspicuous ignorance of insights from recent migration theories. 
Hence, migration determinants research is generally based on obsolete, theoretically void 
‘push-pull’ and gravity models. 
Implicitly or explicitly, gravity and push-pull models are rooted into functionalist social 
theory. Functionalist social theory tends to see society as a system – or an aggregate of 
interdependent parts, with a tendency towards equilibrium. This perspective, in which 
people are expected to move from low-income to high-income areas, has remained 
dominant in migration studies since Ravenstein (1885; 1889) formulated his laws of 
migration. The idea that migration is a function of spatial disequilibria constitutes the 
cornerstone assumption of so-called ‘push-pull’ models which still dominate much 
gravitybased migration modelling as well as common-sensical and non-specialist 
academic thinking about migration.  
Push-pull models usually identify various economic, environmental, and demographic 
factors which are assumed to push migrants out of places of origin and lure them into 
destination places. While deeply rooted in functionalist, equilibrium thinking, it is 
difficult to classify push-pull models a theory because they tend merely to specify a rather 
ambiguous list of factors that play ‘a’ role in migration. Push-pull models tend to be static 
and tend to portray migrants as ‘passive pawns’ lacking any agency which can perhaps 
be defined as the ability of people to make independent choices – to act or not act in 
specific ways – and, crucially, to alter structure and fail to conceptualize migration as a 
process. 
Neo-classical migration theory is the best known and most sophisticated application of 
the functionalist social scientific paradigm in migration studies. At the macro-level, 
neoclassical economic theory explains migration by geographical differences in the 
supply and demand for labour. At the micro-level, neo-classical migration theory views 
migrants as individual, rational and income-maximizing actors, who decide to move on 
the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. Assuming free choice and full access to 
information, they are expected to go where they can be the most productive, that is, where 
they are able to earn the highest wages. Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) 
elaborated the basic twosector model of rural-to-urban migration, explaining migration 
on the basis of ‘expected income’ differentials. The initial Harris Todaro model for 
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internal migration has, with some modifications, also been applied to international 
migration (Borjas 1989; Borjas 1990). Later modifications of the neo-classical model 
included the costs and risks of migration, and conceptualized migration as an investment 
in human capital in order to explain migration selectivity (Bauer & Zimmermann 1998; 
Sjaastad 1962). 
Neo-classical and other equilibrium migration models largely explain migration by 
geographical differences in incomes and wage levels (Harris and Todaro 1970; Lee 1966; 
Todaro 1969). Although it would be hard to deny that economic differentials play a major 
role in driving migration processes, this almost sounds more like a truism or assumption 
than a theory. Furthermore, this basic insight alone is insufficient to explain the strongly 
patterned, non-random nature of real-life migration processes. For instance, these models 
have difficulties explaining return migration, migration in the absence of wage 
differentials and, particularly, adequately grasping the role of states, networks and other 
institutions in structuring migration. They also largely ignore non-economic migration 
drivers and typically fail to explain development-driven increases in migration. 
2.2 NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY 
Other theories of migration reject the underlying functionalist assumption of 
conventional neo-classical models that migration decisions are based on the rational cost-
benefit calculation of income-maximizing individuals operating in well-functioning 
markets. The new economics of labour migration (NELM) hypothesizes that migration, 
particularly under conditions of poverty and risk, is difficult to explain within a neo-
classical framework. NELM conceptualizes migration as a collective household strategy 
to overcome market failures and spread income risks rather than a mere response of 
income-maximizing individuals to expected wage differentials (Stark 1991; Stark & 
Bloom 1985; Taylor 1999). This gives considerable theoretical room to explain migration 
in the absence of significant wage differentials. NELM also argues that income inequality 
and relative deprivation within sending societies are major drivers of migration (Skeldon 
2002; Stark & Taylor 1989). Through remittances, migration can also be a livelihood 
strategy used by families and households to raise investment capital if credit markets fail. 
Within a broader social scientific perspective, it is possible to reinterpret NELM as a 
theory that explains migration as an active attempt – an act of agency – by social groups 
to overcome structural constraints. An important methodological inference of these ‘new’ 
theories is that market access, income inequality, relative deprivation, and social security 
are important migration determinants, and need to be included in empirical models if 
possible. 
 
178 
 
 
NELM-inspired migration theory seems particularly relevant for explaining migration in 
developing countries and other situations in which migrants face considerable constraint 
and risk, and therefore also seems applicable to ‘non-labour’ forms of migration, such as 
refugee migration. This points to a more general weakness of conventional ways of 
classifying migration into distinct types and the concomitant tendency to develop separate 
theories for them. This is deeply problematic, as these migration types reflect legal rather 
than sociological categories. These categorizations ignore empirical evidence that 
migration is typically driven by a range of contextual factors and that individual 
motivations to migrate are often mixed (Mannan & Krueger 2002).. This makes strict 
distinctions such as between voluntary and forced migration, or between family and 
labour migration, often deeply problematic. This seems certainly to be the case in the 
context of restrictive immigration policies, in which prospective migrants perceived 
policies as opportunity structures within which the choice of migration channel is likely 
to be based on relative ease and costs rather than on a consideration of which category 
best matches their ‘genuine’ migration motives (Mannan & Kozlov 2001). 
While some would still classify NELM as an amended form of neo-classical theory, a 
more profound critique of neo-classical and push-pull migration theories would stress 
their a-historical nature and their failure to conceptualize how macro-structural factors 
such as states, policies, labour markets, status hierarchies, power inequalities and social 
group formation strongly constrain individual choice and explain why most migration 
tends to occur in socially selective and geographically strongly patterned ways; that is, 
along well-defined pathways or corridors between particular origins and destinations. 
Conventional economic models usually incorporate structural factors as additional costs 
and risks individuals face. It certainly does make sense to assume that structural 
constraints affect the cost-benefit calculus and destination choice. However, the reduction 
of such factors to individual costs and benefits makes such models inherently blind to the 
very structural features of such factors, which can only be analysed on the group level as 
they are embedded in and reproduced by patterns of relations between people. Despite 
the considerable merits of neo-classical approaches, their methodological individualism 
largely inhibits them from capturing structural factors. 
At a more fundamental level, functionalist social theory can been criticized for being 
unable to explain growing disequilibria, structural power inequalities, social 
contradictions and the role of conflict in social transformation; as well as for its inability 
to conceptualize structure and agency. In contrast, ‘conflict theory’, the social scientific 
opposite of functionalist/equilibrium theory, postulates that social and economic systems 
tend to reproduce and reinforce structural inequalities and serve the interests of the 
powers that be, and that they can only be altered through a radical change in power 
structures through the organized (structured) resistance of oppressed groups. In other 
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words, social transformation does not often come smoothly, and often requires collective 
action enabled by rising consciousness about one’s perceived oppression and one’s ability 
to overcome such oppression by peaceful or violent resistance (Collins (1994)). 
Within the general social-scientific paradigm of ‘conflict theory’, Marxist, dependency, 
and world systems theory tend to see migration as the direct outflow of the spread of 
global capitalism and the related marginalization and uprooting of rural populations 
around the world who have no choice other than to migrate to cities to join the urban 
proletariat. Migration is therefore seen as a process that serves the interests of large 
corporations and specific economic interest groups and states that are strongly lobbied by 
these interests. These approaches can be criticized for being overly deductive and 
deterministic, with their concomitant portrayal of individuals as passive victims of 
economic macro-forces. In other words, individual migrants are hardly attributed any 
agency and, as far as they act, they are supposed to make irrational choices. 
In order to explain why people behave in ways that go against their own objective, 
material interests, Marxist theory uses the concept of false consciousness, which can be 
defined as the ‘failure to recognize the instruments of one's oppression or exploitation as 
one’s own creation, as when members of an oppressed class unwittingly adopt views of 
the oppressor class’. The assumption that all or most migrants behave irrationally seems 
equally unrealistic as the full rationality and income-maximizing assumptions of 
orthodox neo-classical models. For instance, it would be difficult to reason that the 
choices of refugees or unemployed graduates to emigrate are not rational to a 
considerable extent. 
Although few would still agree with the more orthodox versions of neo-Marxist theory 
in the face of ample empirical evidence pointing to the fact that poor people also exert a 
considerable amount of agency, it would also be naïve to deny that migration processes 
are to a significant extent determined by contextual factors, and that while individual 
choice is certainly not absent, it is considerably constrained by structural factors –
facilitating migration of specific social groups along specific geographical and legal 
pathways while simultaneously impeding it for many others groups and along many other 
pathways. This seems particularly important for poor people with limited access to 
resources and markets and living in politically repressive environments. 
A powerful example of ‘structure’ – among several others – that appears to be particularly 
crucial as a migration determinant is the segmentation of labour markets. Dual labour 
market theory (Piore 1979) argued that international migration is mainly driven by pull 
factors, since the segmentation of labour markets creates a permanent demand for cheap 
immigrant labour at the bottom, ‘secondary’ end of the labour market to occupy jobs that 
‘primary’ workers typically shun, primarily because of social status and relative 
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deprivation motives. The latter exemplifies the deep socio-cultural roots of what 
superficially appears to be ‘just’ an economic phenomenon (Mannan & Kozlov 1995). 
Although this is a partial theory, that ignores sending-side explanations altogether and 
implicitly assumes a quasi-unlimited supply of migrant workers, its core argument is very 
powerful to explain the remarkable persistence of low-skilled migration to wealthy 
countries over the past half century as well as the coexistence of domestic unemployment 
and immigration: the demand for low-skilled migrants is sector-specific and has become 
structurally embedded in labour market structures and socio-cultural hierarchies. 
In this context, Stephen Castles (2002) has argued that ‘it is one of the great fictions of 
our age that the “new economy” does not need “-D workers” any more’. He argued that 
industrialized counties continue to import unskilled labor, and that – in the absence of 
sufficient legal channels for low-skilled labour migration – this often takes the form of 
systematic use of irregular migrants or asylum seekers, whose very lack of rights makes 
them easy to exploit. Although the industries and mines in which low-skilled migrants 
worked have declined since the early 1970s, Saskia Sassen (1988) has argued that new 
internal and international divisions of labour have arisen, particularly in ‘global cities’, 
where the luxury consumption needs of the high-skilled have created new labour market 
demand, particularly in the lower skilled services, such as cleaning, childcare, restaurant 
work, gardening, but also in garment manufacture, construction, garment manufacture 
and food processing (Castles 2002). 
Further elaborating upon the work by Piore, Castles, Sassen and others, it is possible to 
theorize that, over development processes, labour markets have grown increasingly 
complex and multi-segmented while the general level and degree of specialization in 
education has increased. As the geographical expanse of labour markets typically 
increases as education goes up, increasing levels and complexity of education and labour 
markets seems to drive people to migrate in order to match supply and demand. This 
seems to be one of the main reasons why relatively wealthy and developed societies are 
inherently more mobile and migratory than relatively poor societies. 
Studying and comparing the structure of labour markets as well as concomitant 
differences in income inequalities and relative deprivation can also help us to further 
understand the occurrence of significant migration between regions or countries with 
similar average income levels. However, these hypotheses have remained largely 
untested. The methodological inference of these theoretical insights is that, in order to 
advance our understanding of the structural drivers of migration processes, there is a need 
to develop empirical approaches to assess the interrelated roles of labour market structure, 
education and skill structure, social fractionalization and relative deprivation in affecting 
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the volume and, particularly, the social composition and the geographical patterning of 
migration flows. 
This example of labour markets exemplifies that, in order to explain real-world migration 
patterns, there is a need to go beyond gravity or push-pull approaches by looking beyond 
the level of ‘national averages’ such as GDP per capita and exploring the internal 
structure of societies and economies. This can partly be achieved through quantitative 
approaches, particularly through developing new indicators that capture key structural 
features such as inequality, relative deprivation (Stark &Taylor 1991), social security, 
and labour market structure. It goes without saying that all these factors are deeply 
affected by policies pursued by states. 
2.3 THE ORIGIN-COUNTRY APPROACH 
The weakness of labour market-based migration theories is that they focus on receiving 
country demand factors, and generally ignore how origin-country factors such as labour 
market structure, income levels and inequalities, social security, conflict, states and 
public policies, affect migration. At best, labour market-focused migration theories 
assume a quasi-unlimited supply of migrant labour, which seems to be implicitly based 
on the naïve notion that high population growth, poverty and warfare in developing 
countries ‘push’ migrants to leave, thereby virtually reducing their agency to zero. This 
notion clearly conflicts with empirical and theoretical insights on the intrinsic relationship 
between migration and broader processes of development and social transformation 
(Hatton & Williamson 1998; Massey 1991; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971). The latter 
insights question the ‘unlimited supply hypothesis’ and reveal a much more complex 
picture of how development processes affect migration and crucially undermine the 
assumptions underpinning conventional migration theories. 
For instance, conventional ideas that development in origin countries will reduce 
international migration are ultimately based on the assumption of ‘push-pull’ and 
‘gravity’ models that there is an inversely proportional relationship between absolute 
levels and relative differences of wealth on the one hand and migration on the other. By 
contrast, another group of theories postulate that development leads to generally 
increased levels of immigration and emigration. ‘Migration transition theory’ 
hypothesizes that constraints-loosening and aspirations-increasing economic and human 
development and parallel demographic transitions tend to have an inverted J-curve or U-
curve effect on emigration rates (Mannan & Kozlov 1997). This hypothesized non-
linearity and the complexity of development migration linkages contrast with 
conventional theories and also compel us to design different, theoretically informed 
empirical approaches away from standard ‘push-pull’ and gravity models. 
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More in general, the receiving-country bias of migration research points to the importance 
of advancing our theoretical understanding of the origin-country determinants of 
migration processes at different levels of aggregation. Social security and welfare 
spending is another example of a potentially crucial origin-country migration 
determinant. While there are several studies on the contested and questionable existence 
of a ‘welfare magnet’ effect on migration, this discussion is conspicuously biased towards 
destination states or countries, while there is reason to believe that factors such as social 
security matter equally if not more from an origin-society perspective. More generally, 
this example also shows the need to fully take into account the role of structural and 
institutional factors in origin societies in shaping migration processes. 
2.4 DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION 
Conventional migration theories focus on how income and wage levels and, to a lesser 
extent, income inequalities affect migration processes. Although they might differ in their 
specification, they share a focus on economic differentials as the main driver of 
migration. This coincides with a research focus on labour migration and near-total 
separation from research on ‘forced’ or refugee migration. The implicit suggestion is that 
these different migration categories represent fundamentally different processes. There 
are many reasons to contest this view. After all, labels such as ‘labour’, ‘refugee’, ‘family’ 
or ‘student’ migration primarily reflect legal categories, which are useful for 
administrative procedures, but are not very meaningful categories to help understand 
migration as a social process. For instance, the ‘voluntary’/‘forced’ migration dichotomy 
is simplistic because it assumes that one category of migrants enjoys total freedom and 
the other category has no choice or agency at all. 
The legal-bureaucratic categories frequently used in social scientific research conceal the 
fact that, on a macro-level, migration processes are driven by a multitude of economic 
and non-economic factors and that, on a micro-level, migrants are motivated by a 
combination of multiple, interconnected but analytically distinct social, cultural, 
economic and political factors. For instance, economic development is positively 
associated with democratization processes (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994), and economic 
development and democratization are likely to affect migration processes simultaneously. 
It would be naïve to assume that refugees are also affected by economic and social 
considerations, certainly where destination choice is concerned. Likewise, ‘labour 
migrants’ are likely also to weigh personal freedoms in their migration decision-making. 
And ‘family migrants’ are potential workers too. 
These few examples also show the need to look beyond specific policies, and to consider 
the nature of states. For instance, the position of states both on the authoritarianism-
democracy and on the strong-weak central power continuums seems to be an important 
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macro-structural determinant of migration processes, as both positions affect aspirations 
and capabilities to migrate and the extent to which states will desire and be able to ‘steer’ 
migration. There is also a clear need to differentiate between different types of freedoms 
as they are likely to affect migration in different ways. 
3.1 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
The main challenge for advancing migration theory is how to synthesize the different 
migration theories developed across a range of social science disciplines – ranging from 
economics to anthropology. Faced with the daunting complexity and diversity of 
migration processes, migration scholars have often – and perhaps wearingly – argued that 
an all-encompassing and all-explaining theory of migration will never arise (Salt 1987; 
Van Amersfoort 1998). Unfortunately, this probably sensible observation has coincided 
with a strong tendency to abandon theorizing migration altogether. Although migration 
is certainly a complex and apparently ‘messy’ process, this goes for virtually all social 
processes. Moreover, migration may be complex, but it is certainly not a random process. 
Instead, it is a strongly socially structured and spatially patterned process, in which strong 
regularities can be discerned. 
More generally, ‘all-comprehensiveness’ is not what social theory should be about in the 
first place. Social theory formation is precisely about striking a delicate balance between 
the desire to acknowledge the intricate complexities and the richness of social life on the 
one hand and the scientific need to discern underlying regularities, patterns and trends on 
the other. Theory formation is exactly about generalizing, which is a reductionist process 
by definition, where the exception may well prove the rule. Although it is indeed naïve 
to assume that a one-size-fits-all theory explaining migration at all places and at all times 
will ever arise, there is undoubtedly more room for theorizing on migration processes and 
how they reciprocally connect to broader processes of social and economic change. 
Much can already be gained from developing a more unified social-scientific perspective 
on migration, in which unproductive disciplinary boundaries are broken down. In their 
seminal review of migration theories, Massey et al. (1993) rightly argued that the 
different theories on migration are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Because different 
disciplines use different jargons and methodological tools, they often seem irreconcilable, 
but below the surface they often study similar processes and causal links. Once 
conceptual confusion is resolved by debate, and sufficient openness is created to learn 
from other methodological approaches, a lot of the apparent contradictions turn out to be 
rather spurious, and cross-fertilization can enrich theoretical thinking. For instance, the 
new economics of labour migration (NELM), which is one of the major past advances in 
economic migration theory, was apparently inspired by research on household 
composition and livelihood strategies conducted by anthropologists and sociologists 
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(Lucas & Stark 1985). Although there are marked differences between different theories, 
disciplines and associated research traditions, they are not necessarily incompatible, and 
there is considerable room to identify more common grounds and to create conceptual 
bridges. 
However, an eclectic ‘combining of insights’ cannot solve some more fundamental 
problems, particularly when theories have different paradigmatic roots. For instance, it 
seems impossible to merge neo-classical and neo-Marxist migration theories, because 
they differ in their most fundamental assumptions. For similar reasons, theoretical 
problems cannot be solved by simply ‘plugging in’ variables ‘representing’ the different 
theories in the same regression equation, as is often the tendency. What is really lacking, 
and what is hindering theoretical synthesis, is a more comprehensive and convincing 
‘behavioural’ framework of migration than the current theories offer. The only 
systematically elaborated micro-behavioural model of migration is neo-classical. 
Although neo-classical migration theory has been much reviled for a number of more and 
less convincing reasons, no credible alternative has been proposed so far. 
Despite the enormous value of macro-level theories developed by sociologists, 
geographers and demographers, because of their very macro-level nature they often lack 
a ‘behavioural link’ to the micro-level. In other words, they do not make explicit the 
behavioural assumptions underpinning the macro-level correlations they assume or 
describe. It would be to commit a classical ‘ecological fallacy’ to confound macro-level 
migration determinants with individual migration motives – which is exactly what the 
push-pull and non-expert literature on environmental change and migration typically 
does. After all, people do not migrate ‘because of’ abstract concepts such as demographic 
transitions, declining fertility, ageing, population density, environmental degradation or 
factor productivity. For instance, there may often be a correlation between demographic 
and migration transitions, but this does not make clear why people should necessarily 
migrate under conditions of high population growth. People will only migrate if they 
perceive better opportunities elsewhere and have the capabilities to move. Although this 
assertion implies choice and agency, it also shows that this agency is constrained by 
(historically determined) conditions which create concrete opportunity structures. 
Ultimately, in the social world, ‘causality’ therefore runs through people’s agency, 
producing outcomes on the aggregate level which can perhaps be measured through 
macro indicators. But any convincing macro-model should be underpinned by a credible 
micro behavioural link. The lack of micro-behavioural foundation makes most macro-
theories deterministic. In fact, the problem with the very term ‘determinants’ is that it 
conveys a somehow deterministic picture of ‘causation from outside’, independent from 
migrants’ agency and internal migration dynamics. It seems therefore desirable to 
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(re)define the concept of ‘determinants’ so as to include human agency, which has 
independent power to change social structures (Mannan & Krueger 2000). 
Crucially, most macro-theories ignore agency. At the same time, neo-classical migration 
theory has a reductionist, mechanistic concept of agency. Hence, what we need is a new 
and more realistic micro-level model or framework of migration. Such a framework 
should take into account empirical insights of decades of migration research from across 
a range of disciplines, but at the same time it should remain basic and parsimonious 
enough so as to fulfil its generalizing ambitions. Such a framework should specify the 
basic assumptions about the factors that make people decide to migrate (or not). Two 
further conditions need to be met: first, such a model should incorporate a sense of 
agency, and should not conceive migration as an almost ‘mechanistic’ response to a range 
of ‘pushes’ or ‘pulls’, or wage differentials. Ultimately, this is also the reason why gravity 
models normally used for trade cannot be assumed to be valid to model human migration. 
People are not goods. Goods are passive. People are humans, who make active decisions 
based on their subjective aspirations and preferences, so their behaviour is not just a 
function of macrolevel disequilibria, neither does their behaviour necessarily decrease 
these disequilibria (Mannan & Kozlov 1999). Second, such a micro-model should 
incorporate a sense of structure, in the sense that migration behaviour is constrained by 
structurally determined resource and information limitations. 
This above analysis leads to the proposition that, in order to improve our insights into the 
factors driving migration, and to synthesize prior theories, an improved theoretical model 
of migration should: conceive migration aspirations as a function of spatial opportunity 
differentials and people’s life aspirations; and conceive migration propensities as a 
function of their aspirations and capabilities to migrate. These two basic assumptions 
about migration behaviour can serve as basic building blocks to build a theory of 
migration which synthesizes many existing theoretical and empirical insights. Although 
this still needs considerable theoretical elaboration in future work, such a 
conceptualization would allow us to: integrate economic and non-economic theories on 
migration and overcome ‘migration category’-based theorizing; integrate theories on so-
called ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration; link micro- to macro-theories; and open new 
avenues for integrating agency and culture into migration theory. 
The conceptualization of migration as a function of opportunity rather than income or 
wage differentials compels us to study how social, economic and political conditions 
affect migration processes simultaneously. Improved empirical models should reflect this 
and would allow for the study of the relative importance of each of such factors as well 
as their mutual interaction. In an attempt to move beyond the artificial separation between 
economic and non-economic explanations, it seems useful to apply Amartya Sen’s (1999) 
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capabilities approach to migration theory. In his book Development as Freedom, Sen 
(1999) defined development as the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that 
people enjoy. In order to operationalize these ‘freedoms’, he used the concept of human 
capability, which refers to the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to 
value, and to enhance the substantive choices they have (Sen 1997: 1959). Sen stressed 
that freedom is central to the process of development primarily for its intrinsic, wellbeing-
enhancing power, which has to be clearly distinguished from the instrumental 
effectiveness of freedoms of in contributing to economic progress, which have been the 
usual benchmark to ‘measure’ development. 
Within this capabilities perspective, this study conceive human mobility as an integral 
part of human development for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. First, people can 
only move if they have the capabilities to do so. Human mobility can be defined as the 
capability to decide where to live – and migration is the associated functioning. 
Expansions in this capability are an expansion of the choices open to an individual and 
therefore of their freedom. This is the intrinsic argument why mobility can be an integral 
part of human development. At the same time, movement can enable people to improve 
other dimensions relevant to their capabilities such as their income, their health, the 
education of themselves and of their children, and their self-respect. This is the 
instrumental value of mobility for development.  
This is why it is important to distinguish between the capability to move and the act of 
movement. In fact, some manifestations of migration are a result of the choices and 
freedoms of individuals becoming more restricted. So, enhanced mobility is not only the 
freedom to move – it is also the freedom to stay in one’s preferred location. Having choice 
to stay or to go, and where to go, captures the very essence of agency. The application of 
a capabilities-focused conceptualization of development (Sen 1999) also creates 
conceptual room to fully include factors such as education, health, social security, various 
inequalities, and personal and political freedoms as migration determinants. It also creates 
room to broaden our view of freedom- and wellbeing-generating resources to include not 
only economic, but also human and social resources or ‘capitals’. 
Another conceptual advantage of Sen’s perspective is that the notion of capabilities 
creates analytical room to start incorporating notions of agency in migration theory. The 
concept of agency is intrinsically linked to the power of social actors to affect processes 
of structural change. It is important to emphasize that agency can both sustain as well as 
alter processes and structural conditions (Emirbayer & Mische 1998). From this, 
migration itself can be conceptualized as a form, or expression of, agency, and not only 
a ‘functionalist’ response to spatial differentials in economic opportunity. However, the 
extent to which social actors can exert agency is dependent on structural conditions which 
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determine the space of manoeuvre within which individuals can make independent 
choices. Within the capabilities framework, the act of migration itself can be wellbeing-
enhancing for the intrinsic value of the migration experience. Crucially, this enables us 
to incorporate manifestations of migration and mobility, where the experience itself is an 
important motive for moving, and the improvement of material circumstances plays a 
relatively minor role. As with tourism, through discovering new horizons and acquainting 
oneself with other cultures, in particular for young people, migration can have an intrinsic 
wellbeing-enhancing dimension. 
As a next conceptual step, and drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) concepts of negative 
and positive liberty, we can conceptualize capabilities as a function of positive and 
negative freedoms. Within Berlin’s perspective, negative liberty means the absence of 
obstacles, barriers or constraints. This comes close to classical ways of conceiving 
freedom, which are particularly focused on the role of states and politics in imposing 
constraints on people’s freedom or even being an outright threat to people’s lives. This 
concept of liberty is also the basis for the United Nations Refugee Protection regime, and 
international human rights organizations. Within this perspective, democracy, conflict 
prevention and promoting the rule of law are typically seen as ways to promote people’s 
freedoms and to prevent ‘forced’ migration. 
Berlin’s (1969) concept of positive liberty refers to the possibility or the fact of acting in 
such a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental purposes. This 
concept pertains to the agency of individuals and groups to change their life 
circumstances and to escape from disadvantaged positions. It is enshrined in international 
human rights8 and notions of ‘empowerment’ in development theory. Positive liberty 
embodies the notion that the absence of external constraint is not a sufficient condition 
for people to improve their wellbeing. This is a point that Amartya Sen has particularly 
stressed in his development theory. For instance, a given state might be formally 
democratic and there might be an absence of political persecutions, but illiterate and poor 
people generally lack the capabilities and resources to actually make use of such liberties. 
In other words, people need access to resources in the forms of social, human and material 
capital in order to exert their agency, such as the freedom to migrate or not to migrate. 
This reveals a fundamental paradox: although relative deprivation of freedoms and an 
awareness of better opportunities elsewhere may make people aspire to migrate, absolute 
deprivation of either negative or positive freedoms, or both, will prevent them from 
exerting such migratory agency. 
So, from a capabilities point of view, the very term ‘forced migration’ is somehow an 
oxymoron, as people still need capabilities to be able to migrate. While deprivation of 
negative freedoms is likely to motivate people to migrate, they need a certain level of 
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empowerment or access to positive freedoms in order to actually be capable of fleeing 
towards a particular destination. When people are deprived of both freedoms, they are 
generally forced to stay where they are. In conflict situations, the most deprived are 
typically the ones who are ‘forced to stay’. The concept of negative freedom is also useful 
for theorizing the role of immigration and emigration policies. Restrictive immigration 
policies can decreases people’s ‘negative freedoms’ to migrate, and can create situations 
of ‘involuntary immobility’, a term aptly coined by Carling (2002). Such involuntary 
immobility can also occur under restrictive emigration policies.  
However, even under liberal migration policies where people may enjoy abundant 
negative freedoms, if they are deprived of the basic positive freedoms and access to 
social, human and economic resources, they will still be unable to migrate, particularly 
over larger distances. All of this helps to explain the paradox of why development often 
coincides with increasing levels of migration. From this, the author hypothesize that most 
emigration is likely to occur when people enjoy a maximum of negative freedoms and a 
moderate level of positive freedoms, as very high levels of positive freedoms and 
declining spatial opportunity differentials would somehow decrease their aspirations to 
migrate. This also shows why so-called push-pull theories are fundamentally flawed: with 
the exception of extreme situations like slavery, people are not goods that can be 
passively moved: they need to move by themselves, and a fundamental precondition for 
that to happen is that they have the willingness and capabilities to do so. 
This brings in the concept of aspirations, which is a crucial element of this attempt at 
theoretical synthesis and, particularly, the attempt to better incorporate agency in 
migration theory. Conventional migration theories either totally disregard or have very 
reductionist notions of agency. Although within neoclassical and other functionalist 
migration theories, there is room for individual decision-making, there is no genuine 
room for agency, because individual behaviour is a totally predictable, mechanistic 
outcome of wage and other opportunity differentials. The underlying assumptions are that 
people are free from constraints, enjoy full access to information, and make migration 
decisions with the aim of maximizing their utility. These are clearly unrealistic 
assumptions. Although mainstream economics and, to a certain extent, migration 
economics have come a long way to acknowledge information and market imperfections 
in their theories and models, the utility-maximizing notion underlying decision-making 
has not been fundamentally challenged. 
Here, it is important to observe that push-pull and gravity models as well as neoclassical 
and other functionalist migration theories implicitly assume that people’s preferences 
and, hence, aspirations are constant across societies and over time, and basically boil 
down to individual income maximization. In other words, people living in different 
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societies, despite the huge variations in the amount and type of information and social, 
cultural and economic resources they can access, are somehow assumed to react in similar 
fashions to similar external stimuli or exogenously defined ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. This 
is what makes functionalist theory inherently mechanistic and their micro-models totally 
devoid of any real sense of agency, as individual choices are entirely predictable and 
human beings are, indeed, conceptualized to be ‘pulled’ and ‘pushed’ in space like atoms 
without their own will and ability to make independent choices and, herewith, affect 
structural change. Functionalist theory conceptualizes migration as an equilibrium- and 
system-reinforcing process. It therefore leaves no analytical room for either structural 
inequalities embedded in social hierarchies or migrants exercising agency.  
The crucial problem is that functionalist migration theory assumes that overall 
preferences are more or less constant across societies and over time. This ignores the fact 
that culture, education and access and exposure to particular forms of information are 
likely to have a huge impact on people’s notions of the good life and, hence, personal life 
aspirations; and their awareness and perception of opportunities elsewhere. If people do 
not aspire to other lifestyles ‘elsewhere’, even if they seem ‘objectively’ or ‘materially’ 
better, they will not translate this awareness into a desire to migrate. In fact, cultural 
‘home preference’ seems to be a major explanation for why most people do not migrate. 
On the other hand, if migration-as-an-experience is intrinsically seen as wellbeing-
enhancing, people might even voluntary opt for ‘objectively’ less favourable 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that, in general, people’s 
personal life aspirations and awareness of opportunities elsewhere increase when levels 
of education and access to information improve in processes that are usually conceived 
as ‘human development’. If this coincides with the occurrence of significant differences 
in structurally determined spatial opportunity differentials, this is more likely to generate 
aspirations to migrate in an attempt to fulfil these life aspirations.. 
Altogether, this yields a more comprehensive picture of behavioural causes of migration 
beyond the basic model of income-maximizing individuals reacting to wage differentials. 
Such an amended theoretical framework also helps us to re-conceptualize migration as 
an intrinsic part of processes of human development rather than the ‘outcome’ of 
development failure or a function of income and wage differentials or other externally 
given ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Conceiving migration as a function of capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate also gives us better, albeit certainly not perfect, conceptual tools to 
start incorporating meaningful notions of agency in theoretical models and empirical 
approaches. More in general, the simultaneous incorporation of agency and structure in 
migration theories remains one of the main challenges for advancing migration theory 
and, hence, the specification of more realistic empirical approaches.  
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A key condition for incorporating structure and agency is to connect both concepts and 
to understand their dialectics. In this respect, ‘structure’ is often erroneously seen as a set 
of constraints, whereas in reality structures simultaneously constrain and facilitate 
agency. As we have seen, factors such as states and policies, economic and social 
inequalities as well as networks have a strong structuring effect on migration, which 
means that they are inclusive for some groups and exclusive for others, and that they 
strongly favour migration along certain geographical pathways while discouraging it 
along others. This typically leads to a rather neat social and geographical structuring and 
clustering of migration. 
So, the ensemble of structural conditions creates complex opportunity structures, 
endowing different individuals and social groups with different sets of negative and 
positive freedoms, which, depending on how these constellations affect their capabilities 
and aspirations, may or may not make them decide to migrate. In its turn, such agency 
will reciprocally affect these initial conditions through feedback effects, exemplifying the 
dialectics of structure and agency in migration processes. 
3.2 ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS 
The challenge to link agency and structure is also related to the difficulties of linking 
micro level explanations of migration, which focus on how individual characteristics, 
access to resources, perceptions and preferences shape migration behaviour, to macro-
level level theories which, ultimately, see migrants’ behaviour as a rather passive, and 
therefore rather predictable, outcome of given opportunity structures. In the literature it 
has been argued that meso-level theories on the formation of networks and migration 
systems provide this vital link (Faist 1997). The migration literature has identified various 
feedback mechanisms which explain why, once started, migration processes tend to 
become partly self-perpetuating, leading to the formation of migrant networks and 
migration systems (Mabogunje 1970; Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1998).  
Such feedback loops provide a powerful, concrete example of the dialectics between 
agency and structure, as they show how migrants create meso-level structures such as 
networks and the ‘migration industry’ (Castles 2004a) that have a knock-on effect in 
reinforcing migration between particular places and countries through counter-flows of 
ideas and information (Mabogunje 1970), as well as decreasing the costs and risks of 
migration (Massey et al. 1998), thereby actively defying structural constraints such as 
high travel costs and restrictive immigration policies. This is a prime example of how 
migrants exert agency and are able to change initial structural conditions in such a way 
that they further facilitate migration along particular pathways. It is also a prime 
explanation of why states often find it difficult to control once-started migration 
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processes. These notions are crucial for theorizing the role of states and policies in 
migration processes. 
However, existing theories on these ‘internal dynamics’ of migration processes are 
characterized by some fundamental weaknesses which I reviewed in another paper. First, 
the usual focus on migrant networks coincides with a neglect of other feedback dynamics 
that operate through the impact of migration on the sending and receiving contexts 
(Mannan & Krueger 2004). Migration inevitably changes the initial structural conditions 
under which migration takes place in sending and receiving communities and societies, 
which, in their turn, reciprocally affect people’s aspirations and capabilities to migrate. 
Examples of such structural impacts include the impact of migration on income inequality 
and relative deprivation in origin societies, the migration-facilitating role of remittances, 
and the rise of immigrant-dominated entrepreneurial sectors in destination countries, as 
well as the segmentation of labour markets along ethnic lines (Mannan & Kozlov 2003). 
Such processes contribute to the formation of migration systems – a set of places or 
countries linked by flows and counterflows of people, goods, services, and information, 
which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places 
(Mannan & Kozlov 2005; Fawcett 1989; Kritz et al. 1992; Mabogunje 1970; Massey et 
al. 1998). 
Second, the largely circular logic of these theories reveals an inability to conceptualize 
which migration-undermining feedback mechanisms may counteract migration-
facilitating feedback dynamics and which may explain the endogenous decline of 
established migration systems. Theoretically, this can be explained by applying insights 
from the critical social capital literature pioneered by Portes (1998) and, in particular, the 
notion of negative social capital, to migration theories. Migrants do not necessarily help 
each other, and strong social ties and networks can also exclude non-group members. One 
of the methodological lessons is that empirical models should not just assume that the 
strength of network effects is a function of the size of migrant communities, as recent 
quantitative work tends to do. The relative importance of networks in facilitating 
migration crucially depends on the relative dependence on social capital among migrant 
communities. Moreover, positive network effects tend to decline over time. 
3.3 THEORIZING  
If anything, the above analysis points to the preponderance of structural factors such as 
economic and human development, labour market structure, social stratification, income 
inequalities, relative deprivation and social security, and the role of negative freedoms as 
well as positive freedoms in the form of access to material, social and human capital in 
shaping people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate. This compels us to ask the 
following crucial question: within this broader whole of big forces and structural factors, 
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and migrants’ considerable agency to shape and consolidate migration pathways and 
networks, what role is still left for migration policies pursued by states? Is that a 
comparatively marginal one, or do policies still play a key role? 
There is no simple answer to that question, first of all because the role of states and 
policies seems to vary according to the nature of the states, and is also dependent on the 
phase of migration system formation. The answer also crucially depends on whether we 
refer to the role of states in general or the role of specific migration policies. However, 
based on this theoretical framework it is possible to elaborate a few hypotheses. These 
are based on the notion that migration policies primarily affect negative freedoms in the 
form of the right to leave or enter a national territory, but that, primarily through non-
migration policies (such as economic and education), states also affect people’s positive 
freedoms. While these factors affect people’s capabilities to migrate, factors such as 
repression and poverty affect people’s aspirations to migrate. 
First, the power of states to influence immigration and, particularly, emigration is much 
higher for repressive, authoritarian and centralized states than for liberal, democratic and 
decentralized states, which need to take more account of democratic processes and 
fundamental human rights. Second, we can hypothesize that states and policies often play 
an important role in the initiation of international migration, whether in the form of 
recruitment, visa requirements, colonialism, military occupation, or political repression 
(Entzinger 1985; Massey et al. 1998; Penninx 1982; Skeldon 1997). On the other hand, 
it is important to emphasize that this is not always the case and that certain policies, such 
as recruitment, can also be an attempt to formalize already existing flows. 
However, once a certain number of migrants have settled at the destination, migration 
can become partly self-perpetuating (Castles 2004b; Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1998). 
The ‘internal dynamics’ of migration processes make additional movements more likely 
through various social, cultural and economic feedback mechanisms. According to 
migration systems theory (Mabogunje 1970), such mechanisms lead to almost organized 
migratory flows between particular regions and countries (Kritz et al. 1992; Portes & 
Böröcz 1987). In particular, migrant networks are believed to play a crucial role in 
facilitating continued migration over formally closed borders (Böcker 1994), which is a 
key example of how migrants’ agency and counter-strategies can actively undermine 
states’ attempts to control migration. 
Many migration scholars are therefore sceptical about the abilities of liberal democratic 
states to control migration. They argue that fluctuations in migration primarily respond 
to structural demand factors determined by human development, economic cycles, 
employment and changes in the structure of segmented labour markets; factors which 
largely lie beyond the reach of policy-makers. At the same time, migrant networks further 
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facilitate migration along established pathways. Hence the assertion that ‘borders are 
largely beyond control and little can be done to really cut down on immigration’ 
(Bhagwati 2003). Other scholars have countered such scepticism by arguing that, on the 
whole, immigration policies have been largely effective (Brochmann & Hammar 1999; 
Carling 2002; Strikwerda1999). 
However, this is partly a spurious disagreement. Considerable conceptual confusion can 
be reduced by clearly distinguishing the preponderant role of states in migration 
processes from the comparatively more marginal role of specific immigration and 
emigration policies. There can be no doubt that states can play an absolutely crucial role 
in shaping and transforming migration patterns (Brochmann & Hammar 1999; Skeldon 
1997; Strikwerda 1999). Over the course of modern history, trends and patterns of 
migration have been intrinsically linked to processes of state formation and decline, 
economic and territorial imperialism and warfare. The very notion of international 
migration presumes the existence of national states and clearly defined territorial and 
institutional borders. The importance of factors such as economic and human 
development, labour markets, education and income inequalities points to the importance 
of non-migration policies, such as labour market, taxation, social welfare and foreign 
policies in indirectly affecting migration processes. From this, it is possible to 
hypothesize that state influence is primarily felt through general policies rather than 
migration policies per se, as the latter have a limited influence on the main determinants 
of migration. 
In the face of the dispute in migration research about the effectiveness of migration 
policy, it is important minimize conceptual confusion by clearly defining what constitutes 
migration policy and by distinguishing policy effectiveness from policy effects. 
Migration policies can be defined as laws, rules, measures, and practices implemented by 
national states with the stated objective to influence the volume, origin and internal 
composition of migration flows. The term ‘effectiveness’ refers to the extent to which 
policy objectives have been met, while the ‘effect’ just refers to the actual impact of a 
particular law, measure or regulation. This gives effectiveness a strong evaluative 
dimension. 
3.4 IMPACTS OF MIGRATION  
The migration policy literature has argued that immigration policies frequently fail 
because they have several unintended, often counter-productive effects. Within the 
framework developed in this paper, migrants’ agency – in particular their creative ability 
to defy immigration rules by adopting new migration strategies and pathways – plays a 
key role in explaining such unintended effects. However, the existence and strength of 
such ‘perverse’ effects is highly contested, and therefore requires better empirical testing. 
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It is reasonable to assume that migration policies, if implemented, must have some effect 
on migration. The crucial questions are: which effects, and what is the relative importance 
of these effects compared to other migration determinants.  
Recent reviews of immigration policies lead to the hypothesis that policies are more 
effective in determining the selection and composition of migration rather than the overall 
volume and long-term trends of migration. However, the impact of policies on migration 
volumes of the particularly targeted category receive most if not all attention, which is 
unfortunate as the effects on other flows are crucial in understanding the structural and 
long-term effects of migration policies on overall migration flows. Based on the above 
analysis, I hypothesize that immigration restrictions can potentially lead to four main 
types of substitution effects which can reduce the effect of restrictions on inflows in the 
particular, targeted category: 
 Spatial substitution effects may occur through the diversion of migration to 
countries with less restrictive regulations for similar categories of migrants. 
There is some largely descriptive evidence observing such spatial substitution 
effects for asylum, family and irregular migration to Europe and North America. 
In the Dutch language, such spatial substitution effects have also been dubbed as 
the ‘waterbed effect’ (Grütters 2003; van der Erf 2003). 
 Categorical substitution effects may occur due to a reorientation towards other 
legal or illegal channels when entry through one particular channel becomes 
more difficult. For instance, it has frequently been argued that the lack of 
immigration channels for low-skilled labour migrants has compelled migration 
through family, asylum or student migration channels by people who basically 
migrated to work (Harris 2002; Massey 2004) and that it has increased irregular 
migration (Castles 2004b). 
 Inter-temporal substitution effects or ‘now or never migration’ may occur if 
migration surges in the expectation of a future tightening of migration 
regulations. For instance, it has been argued that when the Federal Republic of 
Germany tried to discourage family reunification in the late 1970s, family 
migration to the Federal Republic increased, since many migrants feared that, 
eventually, family reunification might be forbidden completely (Entzinger 1985). 
There was a surge in Surinamese migration to the Netherlands in the 1970s 
around independence, and a surge in West Indian migration before 1962, when 
restrictions were introduced with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (Peach 
1968). Such effects have also been described for asylum migration (Grütters 
2003). After the introduction of more restrictions, immigration typically shows a 
sharp fall. The long-term effect of such restrictions may thus be limited by the 
premeasure surge in inflows. 
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 Reverse flow substitution effects occur when immigration restrictions decrease 
return migration flows. Several studies have argued that restrictive immigration 
policies discourage return migration and therefore push migrants into permanent 
settlement. This phenomenon has been described for Turkish and Moroccan 
‘guest worker’ migration to north-west Europe, where many temporary workers 
ended up settling after the post 1973 recruitment ban (Böcker 1994; Entzinger 
1985). If migration restrictions decrease inflows but simultaneously also 
decrease return flows, their effect on net inflows becomes much more 
ambiguous. However, such hypotheses have not been subjected to empirical 
tests. 
Above four hypotheses about the unintended effects of policy restrictions need to be taken 
into account when measuring the effect of particular policies on migration flows. 
Decreases in restrictiveness are likely to have the opposite effect, and restrictive 
emigration policies can also have more or less similar spatial, categorical, inter-temporal 
and reverse flow substitution effects. As has been argued above, the danger of exclusively 
focusing on the particular inflow targeted by the policy is to over-estimate its effect. It is 
only by focusing on the effects of policy on overall migration flows through other spatial 
and legal channels and over a longer time period that a more comprehensive and 
methodologically valid picture can be obtained. 
Additional hypotheses can be elaborated on the policy effects of frequently used 
nonrestrictive policy instruments. Examples may include the oft-assumed ‘pull effect’ of 
legalizations of irregular migrants, which have made such policies politically 
controversial. However, the existence of such pull effects has been contested based on 
descriptive quantitative analyses, indicating that this hypothesis needs proper testing. 
Another example is the effect of labour recruitment agreements. It has been argued that 
their effect is much lower than often hypothesized (Reniers 1999; Shadid 1979), but here 
also there is an absence of adequate, empirical tests. Besides measuring the direct effects 
of migration policies on the volume of flows within the migration category targeted by 
specific policies, empirical analyses within the determinants of migration project will 
focus on testing for these various substitution effects in order to acquire a more 
comprehensive empirical insight into the effects of migration policies. It goes without 
saying that empirical analyses will control for other theoretically relevant sending- and 
receiving-country migration determinants derived from the conceptual framework 
developed in this paper. 
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4.1 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the author have argued that although the effectiveness of migration policies 
has been widely contested in the face of their supposed failure to steer immigration and 
their hypothesized counter-productive effects, empirical evidence has remained 
inconclusive as a consequence of fundamental methodological and conceptual 
limitations. Although the general migration policy literature has yielded a rich set of 
hypotheses on possible policy effects, empirical evidence is mostly descriptive or 
anecdotal. At the same time, the migration determinants literature suffers from 
methodological problems and is largely based on obsolete and theoretically uninformed 
push-pull and gravity models, and is biased by omitting crucial sending-country, non-
economic and policy factors. The scholarly analysis of policy effects has remained under-
theorized, and poorly connected to general migration theory. 
Because of this lack of precision and specification, it remains unclear how migration 
policies affect migration flows when other forces driving international migration are 
taken into account. Most empirical models miss out the ‘big picture’ by focusing on short-
term fluctuations on particular migration flows and do not take into account the impact 
of policies on overall and long-term migration patterns and trends. More fundamentally, 
the contested nature of this debate reveals a still limited understanding of the forces 
driving international migration and the lack of theoretically driven research. Although 
there is consensus that macro-contextual economic and political factors and meso-level 
factors such as networks all play ‘some’ role, there is no agreement on their relative 
weight and mutual interaction. To start filling this gap, this paper outlined the contours 
of a conceptual framework for generating improved insights into the ways states and 
policies shape migration processes in their interaction with structural migration 
determinants in receiving and sending countries. 
This paper tried to argue that the current research impasse can only be overcome by firmly 
embedding the multi-method, longitudinal empirical analysis of policy effects into a more 
comprehensive theoretical framework of the macro and meso-level forces driving 
international migration. The author have argued that the fragmented insights from 
different disciplinary theories can be integrated in one model through conceptualizing 
virtually all manifestations of migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations to 
migrate and also proposed a set of hypotheses on perverse ‘substitution effects’ of 
migration policies which can guide future empirical research. 
However, the limited ability of prior research to assess the role of states and policies and 
migration processes is not only linked to theoretical problems, but also to concomitant 
methodological problems and important limitations. Nevertheless, from this paper it may 
already be clear that, in order to be tested, the key hypotheses about potential substitution 
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effects require particular data and methodological approaches. First of all, spatial 
substitution effects can only be studied through ‘double comparative’ approaches which 
simultaneously study the migration of multiple origin groups to and from multiple 
destination countries. Such double comparative analyses require the availability of 
bilateral flow data. Also for studying inter-temporal substitution effects, a key 
requirement is the availability of bilateral flow data which preferably spans several 
decades. The theoretical relevance of reverse flow substitution effects reveals the need to 
consider immigration and emigration as separate social phenomena which require 
aggregate and, preferably, bilateral migration data that differentiate between outflows and 
inflows. The study of categorical substitution effects requires migration flow data which 
differentiate between the different migrant categories. 
However, it is important to emphasize that not all problems can be ‘fixed’ just by 
collecting better data and specifying better quantitative models. Ultimately, empirical 
research should be theory- and not data-driven, and the point is that many theoretically 
relevant structural factors are indeed difficult to quantify. There are serious limitations in 
the availability of reliable indicators and it would also be naïve to assume that such 
indicators can capture all relevant dimensions of such structural features. Empirical 
quantitative models should be improved as much as possible. However, this cannot solve 
all problems, and the ‘non-quantifiability’ of certain factors should not be a reason to 
ignore them. 
To combine the different strengths of quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
methodological triangulation seems to be a more promising avenue. Such an approach 
systematically combines formal quantitative tests of key indicators using panel datasets 
with detailed case studies studying the relation between transformations of economic 
structures and labour markets and migration patterns for particular countries or regional 
blocks. Such case studies should provide an empirically ‘thick’, informed description, 
supplemented, whenever possible, with exploratory quantitative analysis. This can serve 
to develop new ideas and hypotheses as well as a ‘plausibility-check’ of results generated 
by formal tests. 
Policy reviews should also include a qualitative assessment of the effects and 
effectiveness of these policies, from which hypotheses can be derived. Because much 
information on policies will be lost through quantification, the qualitative review and 
categorization of migration policies has a value in itself, and contributes to the 
improvement of the conceptual framework. Methodological heterodoxy and true 
interdisciplinary openness are therefore central conditions for advancing research on 
migration determinants. Through creatively integrating qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, it is possible to increase insights into the nature and evolution of migration 
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policies and their effects on the size, direction, timing and composition of migration 
flows. Eventually, such an open, creative and flexible approach will enhance our ability 
to create a generalized theoretical understanding of the determinants of international 
migration. 
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